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Abstract 
This essay examines Paul Ricœur’s views on recognition in his book The Course of Recognition. It highlights 
those aspects that are in some sense surprising, in relation to his previous publications and the general 
debates on Hegelian Anerkennung and the politics of recognition. After an overview of Ricœur’s book, the 
paper examines the meaning of ‚recognition‛ in Ricœur’s own proposal, in the dictionaries Ricœur uses, 
and in the contemporary debates. Then it takes a closer look at the ideas of recognition as identification and 
as ‚taking as true.‛ Then it turns to recognition (attestation) of oneself, in light of the distinction between 
human constants (and the question ‚What am I?‛), and human variables (and the question ‚Who Am I?‛). 
The last section concerns the dialectics of struggles for recognition and states of peace, and the internal 
relationship between the contents of a normative demand and what counts as satisfying the demand. 
Keywords: Paul Ricœur, Recognition, Attestation, Identity, Human Constants 
Résumé 
Cet article examine les thèses de Paul Ricœur sur la reconnaissance dans son livre Parcours de la 
reconnaissance. Il met en lumière des aspects de cet ouvrage qui peuvent, en plusieurs sens, nous suprendre, 
au regard des ouvrages antérieurs du philosophe, ou encore au regard des débats généraux sur 
l’Anerkennung hégélienne et sur les politiques de reconnaissance. Après avoir dressé un aperçu général du 
livre, la contribution analyse le sens du terme de ‚reconnaissance‚ dans la conceptualisation Ricœurienne, 
dans les dictionnaires que Ricœur mobilise à l’appui de son argumentation, et dans les débats 
contemporains. Ensuite, l’article s’attarde sur l’idée de reconnaissance comme identification et comme  
‚tenir pour vrai‚. Puis, il se tourne vers la reconnaissance (attestation) de soi-même, à travers la distinction 
entre les  ‚invariants humains‚ (et la question  ‚qu’est-ce que je suis?‚), et les  ‚variations humaines ‚ (et la 
question ‚qui suis-je?‚). La dernière section se focalise sur la dialectique entre les luttes pour la 
reconnaissance et les états de paix, d’une part, et la relation interne entre le contenu d’une demande 
normative et ce qui importe comme satisfaisant une demande, d’autre part.    
Mots-clés: Paul Ricœur, Reconnaissance, Attestation, Identité, Invariants humains  
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In this essay, I examine Paul Ricœur’s views on recognition in his book The Course of 
Recognition.1 I wish to highlight those aspects of his take on recognition that are in some sense 
surprising. Something can be a surprise only relative to expectations, so I will first try to explicate 
the nature of the expectations, or the kinds of contextual background, against which Ricœur’s 
book on recognition stands out. 
One of these contexts is provided by the dictionaries that Ricœur consults for the 
meanings of ‚recognition‛ at the beginning of his book. There are interesting discrepancies and 
overlappings between the dictionaries and Ricœur’s own discussion of them: for example, 
‚recognition of self‛ is central to Ricœur but not mentioned in the dictionaries, and ‚acceptance 
of validity‛ is present in the dictionaries but not thematized by Ricœur.  
Another context is provided by Ricœur’s earlier writings on ‚human constants,‛ 
especially on subjectivity and capable human agency.2 These writings give rise to various 
expectations concerning what Ricœur might discuss in a book on recognition: these include 
highlighting the asymmetry of self-relations and other-relations, but avoiding both the 
Husserlian and Levinasian extremes while doing so, stressing the relevance of human agency, 
and the attestation of capabilities (but also fallibility and vulnerability) of agents. These 
expectations are met – indeed, it is surprising how much of these books on human agency 
(almost their entirety) Ricœur now covers under the titles of identification and recognition of self. 
It might be thought that ‚recognition‛ equals ‚intersubjectivity,‛ but for Ricœur, only recognition 
of and by others does so: the semantic field is broader, so all kinds of cognition and self-
attestation are now included as kinds of ‚recognition,‛ whether or not they are constitutively 
intersubjective (which they of course do turn out to be in some sense).  
 A further background consists of the debates on ‚human variables‛ in terms of cultural 
identities, multiculturalism, politics of recognition, politics of identity and difference, including 
Ricœur’s own writings on thick selfhood and narrative identity (especially in Oneself as Another, 
Time and Narrative, and a number of his essays).3 Here, one would have expected a rich analysis 
of how narrative self-definitions and thick identities are dialogically constituted in relations of 
recognition to others, and how cultural, practical, social, ethical and narrative aspects of thick 
identities relate to each other. The surprise here is how little, almost nothing, Ricœur says of all 
this, given that ‚Ricœurian‛ views on layers of self-relations could be anticipated on the basis of 
his earlier writings, as I hope to sketch below. Ricœur is right to oppose the narrow focus of these 
debates on cultural variables and differences, but it is nothing short of surprising that he does not 
develop his rich account further in this context. Recognition is also about dialogical constitution 
of thick narrative, evaluative, practical identities. 
Yet another background consists of the Hegelian and Honnethian developments of the 
notion of Anerkennung, covering both human constants and variables, but also issues of social and 
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institutional reality and normativity.4 In these debates two senses of ‚recognition‛ often are 
intertwined, that of (mutual) recognition of agents (self and others) who are recognized by one 
another, and that of normative acknowledgement of values, reasons, principles, institutions as 
valid. It is a bit surprising, then, that Ricœur’s threefold distinction of senses of recognition 
(identification of anything, self-attestation and mutual recognition with others) excludes a central 
sense of recognition of values or normative entities as valid.5 
Finally, as often happens, some expectations arise while reading the book, and later 
passages in the same book may be surprising in light of them. This is perhaps the case with 
Ricœur’s discussion of struggles for recognition and states of peace, as I hope to show below. 
From Identification and Self-Attestation to Mutual Recognition 
Ricœur’s usage of the term ‚recognition‛ is much broader than is customary in debates 
about the politics of identity and difference, which have ‚most contributed to popularizing the 
theme of recognition, at the risk of turning it into something banal.‛6 He thinks that the kind of 
social standing related to cultural differences is only one of many species of mutual recognition, 
and furthermore, that mutual recognition in all of its forms differs from two other kinds of 
recognition discussed in the book. The other two are discussed in the first two chapters of the 
book: first, identification of anything as the thing that it is; second, recognition of oneself as a capable 
agent. 
In Ricœur’s own description, the master threads of i) identity, ii) alterity and iii) dialectic 
of recognition and misrecognition structure the book, and each develops along the way. i) Idem-
identity excludes alterity, but alterity is constitutive of existential Ipse-identity; ii) Self-recognition 
or self-assertion of one’s capacities ‚anticipates‛ mutuality or reciprocity, but does not yet 
accomplish it; iii) There is a development from ‚misidentifications‛ or mere mistakes via self-
deception and failures of self-understanding to refusals of recognition of others, struggles for 
recognition, distorted forms of gift-giving and finally to the satisfactory experiences of getting 
recognition and states of peace.7 
Ricœur starts from an observation that although there are libraries full of books on 
theories of knowledge, there are no corresponding theories of ‚recognition.‛ Recognition has 
surfaced only in a couple of ‚thought events‛ in the history of philosophy: Kant uses the term 
Rekognition in the Critique of Pure Reason, Bergson discusses recognition of oneself in memory, and 
the young Hegel discusses Anerkennung in a social context. These seem to be about very different 
things. Ricœur wants to show that the topic of recognition has some unity, at least some ‚rule-
governed polysemy,‛ which links these and other ‚thought events‛ together, regardless of 
whether or not the term was explicitly used in them. As it happens, Kant’s Rekognition turns out 
to be a disappointment for Ricœur, and Bergson is discussed only for a couple of pages. But, 
many other minor occurrences of ‚recognition‛ are reported along the way. Perhaps surprisingly, 
neither Fichte nor Hegel’s Phenomenology are hardly mentioned. Moreover, Ricœur does not 
really engage with analytical philosophy at all, which would have been relevant for the topic of 
the first chapter, at the very least. 
Ricœur introduces his topic by asking what dictionaries might tell us about the unity of 
the term ‚recognition,‛ or reconnaissance. This section of the book works surprisingly well in 
English translation. The meanings of the French word are mostly covered by the English one, the 
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main difference being that ‚gratitude‛ is much more central in the French term. By contrast, there 
is no neat translation to German. For example, neither anerkennen, wiedererkennen nor Recognition 
covers the whole scope of this term. 
Here’s one way of summing up the various (more than twenty) meanings of the word 
mentioned in the dictionaries.8 There is, first, a family of meanings related to identification of 
things. We can identify familiar people and objects directly by their holistic style or bearing, or 
we can identify things for the first time by some mark. Second, there is a family of meanings 
related to accepting some claim or document as true or valid. Thirdly, there is a family of senses 
in which recognition concerns people. To recognize can be for example ‚to bear witness through 
gratitude that one is indebted to someone for (something, an act)‛ or ‚to accept (a person) as a 
leader, master‛ and the recognized person can be ‚someone who is declared to possess a certain 
quality.‛ One may note in passing that Ricœur’s ‚recognition of oneself‛ does not figure in the 
dictionaries discussed.9 Furthermore, recognition as accepting as true or valid seems to be more 
prominent than Ricœur notes. Thus, an alternative ‚course‛ of recognition might as well move 
from recognition-identification to recognition-acceptance as true or valid (‚recognition-adhesion‛ 
(211) and then to what Ricœur calls ‚recognition-attestation‛ of oneself and others.  
Chapter One, ‚Recognition as Identification,‛ discusses Descartes, Kant, and 
phenomenologists from Husserl to Merleau–Ponty. It emerges that identification is threatened 
not only by mistaking some individual thing for some other individual thing, but also by a failure 
to construe something as an individual thing at all. Although it is not explicitly stressed by 
Ricœur, one can say that these two kinds of failures of identification may be relevant in political 
contexts. People sometimes see ‚groups‛ where there really are – or should be – none (and there 
may be struggles aiming at dissolving the very idea that the xs form a unified group), or people 
may fail to perceive groups which do demand positive recognition as a group, and sometimes of 
course people mistake some groups or individuals for others (so that they may buy the idea that 
Saddam Hussein might have been responsible for Al-Qaeda’s deeds). 
Overall, there seem to be five themes discussed under the topic of recognition as 
identification: i) identification as a synthesis (say, perceiving a shape and not just dots; perceiving 
a material body and not just profiles and silhouettes; a forest and not just trees), which may be 
quite automatic in the case of human persons, but not so in the case of recognizing groups; ii) 
identification as distinguishing something from other things, for example, identifying a person as 
the individual that she is; iii) identification on the basis of marks versus on the basis of more 
holistic ‚style‛; iv) the relevance of presence, disappearing and reappearing, and change10; v) 
(with Descartes) the topic of accepting ‚an idea‛ as true.  
Chapter Two introduces an important presupposition to the debates about mutual 
recognition: the fact that we are able to act, that we are capable agents, and therefore capable of 
taking responsibility. The chapter links up with Ricœur’s earlier analysis (in Oneself as Another) of 
the kind of certitude with which we recognize that we have various capacities as agents. It differs 
from descriptive ‚identification‛ as discussed in the first chapter. The type of recognition in 
question is ‚attestation,‛ expressed by self-assertions such as ‚I believe that I can,‛ and implicit 
in anything that we do.11 There is really no discussion of the sense of recognizing one’s identity, 
of who one is in particular (and not merely the fact that, like others, one is a capable, responsible 
agent). This is surprising, given Ricœur’s famous earlier analyses of ipse-identity and narrative 
identity, which no doubt are related to recognition of oneself. 
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In Chapter Two Ricœur first discusses Greek texts and agrees with Bernard Williams’ 
thesis that a cultural constant about humans as ‚centers of agency‛ and as responsible actors can 
be found in the Greek texts. The next section, entitled ‚A Phenomenology of the Capable Human 
Being,‛ introduces the topic of recognizing oneself as an agent, as having various capacities to 
speak, to act, to narrate, and to take responsibility. This section covers the main themes of 
Ricœur’s Oneself as Another in a rather dense manner. The third section is entitled ‚Memory and 
Promises,‛ which also covers themes from his book Memory, History, Forgetting.12 Ricœur points 
out, following Bergson, that there is an implicit recognition of self in recognizing images or 
memories. And there is a peculiar kind of persistence of self that takes place in promises: even if 
my inclinations would change in the future, I now commit myself to doing something then. This 
is crucial for Ricœur’s idea that idem-identity (identity as sameness) and ipse-identity (identity as 
selfhood) are in a dialectical relationship. The last section in the second chapter is entitled 
‚Capacities and Social Practices‛. It first discusses social practices and collective representations, 
and then discusses how Ricœur’s capacities relate to Sen’s capability approach. 
Ricœur’s point, in preceding the discussion of mutual recognition by a discussion of the 
capacities and capabilities of each can be seen as a criticism of a certain kind of ‚constructivism‛ 
about agency. One’s agency does not emerge in being recognized by others or oneself, but there 
are grounds in one’s factual capacities and potentials. Self-recognition or self-assertion of one’s 
capacities merely ‚anticipates‛ mutuality or reciprocity, but does not yet accomplish it.13 ‚If it is 
possible to abstract from every bond of intersubjectivity in analysing capacities on the level of 
potential actions, the passage from a capacity to its exercise does not allow for such an elision.‛14 
‚In these different ways self-recognition refers to others without this reference’s assuming the 
position of a ground, like that of the power to act, nor does the ‘before others’ imply reciprocity 
or mutuality. The mutuality of recognition is anticipated in this ‘before others’ but is not 
accomplished in it.‛15 
 Chapter Three turns to interpersonal recognition and creates the sense of philosophical 
aporia that characterizes Ricœur’s best work. Ricœur starts by discussing the asymmetry of the 
self and the other, by referring to the directly opposed versions of this asymmetry given by 
Husserl and Levinas, respectively. Ricœur’s point is to warn against forgetting the real 
dissymmetries in the search for mutuality between the self and the other. After this initial 
warning, Ricœur discusses Hobbes’s challenge to political philosophy, and interprets Hegel’s 
notion of Anerkennung as a response to Hobbes. For Hegel ‚the desire for recognition occupies 
the place held in the Hobbesian conception of the state of nature by the fear of a violent death.‛16 
Ricœur does not discuss the most famous passages on recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit, but focuses solely on Hegel’s earlier texts. In this, Ricœur follows Axel Honneth’s Struggle 
for Recognition, the main text in contemporary debates on this topic. This leads to a lengthy and 
interesting commentary on Honneth’s work. In Ricœur’s view ‚the correlation between the three 
models of recognition inherited from Hegel and the negative forms of disregard‛ is ‚the most 
important contribution by Honneth’s book to the theory of recognition in its post-Hegelian 
phase.‛17 ‚The three models of recognition provide the speculative structure, while the negative 
sentiments give flesh and blood to the struggle for recognition.‛18 
 The first form of recognition, love, is ‚constituted by strong emotional attachments 
among a small number of people.‛19  This is a pre-juridical form of reciprocal recognition where 
‚subjects mutually confirm each other with regard to their concrete needs and thereby recognize 
each other as needy creatures.‛20 Such attachments are inconsistent with direct violations of 
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physical integrity (as Honneth stresses), or negations of approbation (as Ricœur stresses) that 
systematically affect a person’s basic self-confidence. ‚Humiliation, experienced as the 
withdrawal or refusal of such approbation, touches everyone at the prejuridical level of his or her 
‚being-with‛ others. The individual feels looked down on from above, even taken as 
insignificant. Deprived of approbation, the person is as if nonexistent.‛21 
The second form of recognition, universal respect, is institutionalized in the legal 
recognition of rights. Corresponding to different kinds of rights, there are various specific forms 
of disrespect. The humiliation that relates to a denial of civil rights is different from a denial of 
political rights, or welfare rights.  
The third form of recognition concerns the social dimension of politics, Sittlichkeit in its 
broadest sense, which is irreducible to juridical ties. The concept of social esteem differs from 
self-respect and self-confidence and ‚functions to sum up all the modes of mutual recognition 
that exceed the mere recognition of the equality of rights among free subjects.‛22 It is a matter of 
‚the notions that go with the idea of social esteem, such as prestige or consideration.‛23 People 
need recognition of ‚the importance of their individual qualities for the life of others.‛24 
Ricœur then turns to a very fruitful addition to Honneth’s analysis of struggles for 
esteem. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot25 speak of justification as ‚the strategy by which 
competitors give credence to their respective places in < economies of standing.‛26 People’s 
standing can be evaluated to be great or small in the light of qualifying tests specific to different 
contexts, which Boltanski and Thevenot call ‚cities‛ or ‚worlds.‛ ‚In each case, the evaluation of 
performances is based on a battery of tests that the protagonists must pass in competitive 
situation, if they are to be said to be ‘justified.’‛27  
They name six different contexts. ‚For example, there is the question of ‘inspired 
greatness’ as applied to artists and other creative individuals.‛28 There is a ‚city of inspiration‛ 
illustrated by Saint Augustine’s City of God.  What matters is grace as distinguished from 
vainglory. ‚In this city, no credit is accorded to recognition by others, at least in terms of 
renown.‛29 ‚But renown is precisely what the city of opinion refers to, in which standing 
depends only on the opinions of others. Ties of personal dependence are what decide one’s 
importance in the eyes of others. Here honor depends on the credit conferred by other people.‛30 
In addition, they enumerate the domestic, civic, commercial and industrial cities, each with rival 
standards of social standing.31  
There are feelings of injustice, for example, when such tests are corrupted, and 
differences of opinion arise, and the ‚worlds‛ may also challenge and even invalidate each 
others. There is a typology of types of criticism directed by one world to another: ‚What is the 
standing of a great industrialist in the eyes of a great orchestra director? The capacity to become 
great in another world may even be eclipsed by success in some order of standing.‛32 But one 
may note that perhaps this is balanced by the tendency of elites to form clubs. As ways of 
responding to such disagreements between and within worlds, Boltanski and Thevenot favor 
figures of compromise over those of consensus in dealing with the idea of agreement.33  
Ricœur stresses the capacity of persons to understand a world other than one’s own. 
Ricœur suggests that the model of compromise is superior, for example, to Charles Taylor’s 
insistence that mutual recognition must deal with genuine value judgments. Ricœur stresses, 
however, that the vertical role of the state, political power, and authority must be added to the 
claims put forward by Honneth, Thevenot and Boltanski. 
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Ultimately, Ricœur wants to question the importance of the idea of ‚struggle‛ that 
Hobbes, Hegel, Honneth, Thevenot and Boltanski all give central place. Ricœur asks: ‚when, we 
may ask, does a subject deem him- or herself to be truly recognized?‛34 Ricœur sees that this 
might be an insatiable quest. ‚Does not the claim for affective, juridical and social recognition, 
through its militant, conflictual style, end up as an indefinite demand, a kind of ‘bad infinity’?‛35 
To answer this worry, Ricœur looks for circumstances, which would reveal the 
possibility of genuine recognition in a particularly convincing manner. Ricœur looks for actual 
experiences of ‚states of peace‛ to get confirmation that the moral motivation for struggles for 
recognition is not illusory.36 Ricœur takes practices of giving and receiving gifts to be such an 
exemplary context. Ricœur’s main point in discussing gift-giving is to stress the role of gratitude 
as a response to a gift. Giving a gift in return is not the first response, nor is there a mechanic 
need to reciprocate: gratitude is as such an adequate way of establishing mutuality. A central 
meaning of the French word ‚reconnaissance‛ is gratitude, and Ricœur’s observations about gift-
giving and gratitude are among the highlights of this book. 
The exchange of gifts illuminates two central aspects of mutual recognition. The first is 
‚the irreplaceable character of each of the partners in the exchange. The one is not the other. We 
exchange gifts, but not places.‛37 The second is the difference of mutual recognition from any 
form of fusional union, whether in love or friendship: ‚A just distance is maintained at the heart 
of mutuality, a just distance that integrates respect into intimacy.‛38 
Below, I will suggest a different way of understanding the nature of struggles and states 
of peace, in terms of the normative demands and their conditions of satisfaction. Nonetheless, the 
main claims of Ricœur’s last chapter are hard to resist. We should not exaggerate possibilities of 
mutuality or forget the original asymmetry of the self and the other. We should not forget the 
role of vertical power relations in discussing the struggles for recognition, but at the same time, 
we should not deny that at least fleeting experiences of genuine mutual recognition are possible 
(even in an imperfect world). 
What is Recognition? Dictionaries, Ricœur and Contemporary Debates 
As mentioned above, Ricœur introduces the word ‚recognition‛ by going through 
various French dictionaries. Grand Robert de la langue francaise (2nd ed 1985, edited by Alain Rey), 
includes ‚recognition‛ in three major senses - identify; take as true; be grateful or acknowledge a 
debt - which branch to several further meanings, while Littre’s Dictionaire de la langue francaise 
(1859-1872) enumerates no less than twenty-three meanings for recognition and five senses of 
reconnu, (‚that which is recognized‛). 
Even at the most general level, there are some salient contrasts between what the 
dictionaries (‚D‛) list (D1 identify; D2 take as true; D3 be grateful or acknowledge a debt), the 
three senses that Ricœur (‚R‛) uses to structure the book (R1 to identify anything, R2 to recognize 
one’s self, R3 to recognize and be recognized by others), and the usage of ‚recognition‛ in the 
debates on politics (‚P‛) of recognition (P1 to identify anything; P2 to acknowledge norms and 
institutions as valid; P3 to stand in relations of recognition to other recognizers).39 Still, what is 
common to all these is that the the first sense (D1, R1, P1) is related to identification of an object 
of any kind, something that persists changes and remains the same until ultimately ceases to 
exist; what are called ‚individuals,‛ ‚particulars,‛ or ‚continuants‛ in analytical ontology.  
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To identify in this sense is to join together impressions, to take as an entity, as ‚a 
something‛ in the first place (to see the forest from the trees; to see the shape and not just dots; to 
see a solid material entity and not just profiles or patches of colour; to conceptualize a set of 
individuals as a group, and so forth). The Kantian approach to identification stresses this 
identification as a thing, as a ‚something.‛ Note that it is possible here to identify something as 
one thing without taking a stand on what it is. A more informative sense, though, is to identify 
(for the first time perhaps) on the basis of distinguishing marks as this individual, or to categorize 
something as having these particular features, or as belonging to this generic kind. This also 
includes to re-identify something, either on the basis of distinguishing marks again, or typically 
with familiar objects or individuals, more holistically on the basis of the individual’s style or 
Gestalt. 
What is also common to the definitions is that the third sense seems to concern relations 
between persons (or recognizers) (D3, R3, P3). In the French dictionaries, especially gratitude or 
acknowledgement of debt: ‚To bear witness through gratitude that one is indebted to someone 
for (something, an act),‛ but also ‚to accept (a person) as leader, master‛ or ‚To submit to the 
authority of some person.‛ What is recognized can be ‚someone who is declared to possess a 
certain quality‛ or ‚he who receives signs of gratitude‛ and thus is rewarded. The third part of 
Ricœur’s book connects to contemporary debates on politics of recognition (via discussion of 
Honneth), so it is no wonder that there is an overlap in that meaning between R3 and P3.  
Yet, what lies between the first and third senses diverges greatly between dictionaries, 
Ricœur’s book and mainstream contemporary debates. The topic of Ricœur’s second chapter, 
recognition of oneself, is totally missing from the dictionaries (R2).40 And in the contemporary 
debates on philosophy of recognition, recognition of oneself is not typically distinguished as a 
separate sense of recognition, it is just stressed heavily that recognizing oneself and recognizing 
and being recognized by others are dialectically dependent (disrespect from others breeds lack of 
self-respect, lack of self-respect breeds failure to respect others, and so on).41 So it is a kind of 
surprise, both in relation to the French word, and debates on recognition, to find ‚recognition of 
self‛ as a separate topic.42 
The sense of ‚recognition‛ or ‚acknowledgement‛ of norms, reasons, principles, 
institutions, values as valid, while prevalent in contemporary debates on recognition (P2), is  
missing from the dictionaries43 as well as Ricœur’s book. Such issues are not thematized, 
although they are briefly touched upon, as in the following passage: ‚recognition intends two 
things: the other person and the norm. As regards the norm, it signifies, in the lexical sense of the 
word, to take as valid, to assert validity; as regards the person, recognition means identifying each 
person as free and equal to every other person.‛44  
By contrast, the dictionaries’ second family of meanings is that of ‚taking as true‛ (D2). 
These can be said to include the following: a) To take as true, to recognize that so-and-so is the 
case; b) To admit that so-and-so is the case (after hesitation or denial etc); c) To notice a relevant 
feature (To recognize the danger, to recognize someone’s innocence etc), or d) To avow an error, 
a mistake. This certainly is a central usage of the term, and both Ricœur’s book and contemporary 
analyses of senses of ‚recognition‛ might be strengthened by clarifying how their interests differ 
from this. Apparently, Ricœur’s first sense is meant to cover this as well, as he focuses on the 
phenomenon of identification as judging (and indeed says that Descartes’s views on 
identification cover that sense as well). To sum up, a more complete ‚course‛ of recognition 
might include the following: i) identifying a thing; ii) taking a claim as true; iii) accepting norms 
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as valid; iv) recognition of oneself; v) recognition of the other  [and perhaps one should add, vi) 
recognition of collective agents, groups, organizations, institutions].45 
Recognition as Identification and “Taking as True” 
In his Chapter One, Ricœur discusses ‚identification‛ in three steps. The first step is the 
‚phenomenology of judgment‛ as discussed by Descartes, who stresses the possibility of error, 
hesitation, doubt. Descartes’s main point can be put in terms of visual illusions: perceptions may 
mislead, and we cannot change the way we see visual illusions, but our judgements are more 
voluntary than perceptions. Should we believe that the two lines are equally long? This moment 
of ‚assent‛ then depends on us, and we decide on the basis whether we ‚receive as true‛ the 
idea, especially whether the idea is clear and distinct.46 Closely related to recognizing as true is 
the idea that identifying something is distinguishing it from everything else. For Descartes 
‚identifying goes hand in hand with distinguishing,‛ whereas for Kant identifying will be a 
matter of connecting together a manifold in the first place.47 Ricœur’s second step then is the 
‚synthesis‛ as theorized by Kant, joining together, the interplay of receptivity and 
understanding, and the role of ‚schematism‛ and imagination in this. The third is the move from 
transcendental ‚representation‛ to intentionality-in-the-world as discussed by Husserl, 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty. These authors enable us to distinguish recognition from knowing, by 
turning our attention to more complex temporal and emotionally involved phenomena: it is one 
thing, no doubt interesting, to ask about the ‚synthesis‛ of an object I continuously turn in my 
hands and see one silhouette at a time, and another thing to discuss an object (or person) that 
appears, disappears and reappears, or may not reappear, especially when the objects or persons 
in question may be emotionally significant, or are subject to radical changes and aging, and may 
threaten to become unrecognizable. Ricœur thinks the word ‚recognition,‛ with the connotations 
of doubt, hesitation, and the possibility of mistake is most appropriate for such situations.  
Here are three comments on how Ricœur sees the connections of these issues to those in 
the subsequent chapters. First, Ricœur writes that ‚being distinguished and identified is what the 
humiliated person aspires to.‛48 This may often be so, but clearly identification is not always 
enough for the kind of ‚recognition‛ that is opposed to ‚humiliation.‛ Recognition in the 
relevant sense might be refused in spite of successful identification. Suppose someone is 
deliberately humiliating this distinguished and identified person. Or taking unjustified revenge, 
which presupposes identification and being distinguished. Or, on a positive case, suppose 
someone is ‚indiscriminately‛ respecting everyone (without identifying and distinguishing 
people from one another, as behind a ‚veil of ignorance‛ concerning any details which can be put 
aside) – that seems to be recognition without relevant distinctions from others (although it of 
course presupposes the separateness of persons, so some kind of distinguishing is admittedly at 
stake). 
Second, Ricœur asks ‚does not the verb to accept, in the expression to accept as true, hold 
in reserve descriptive resources that go beyond the simple operations of defining and 
distinguishing?‛49 In Ricœur’s view the Cartesian phenomenology of judgment brings together 
two meanings of recognition as identification that the Robert lexicon separates: ‚to grasp (an 
object) with the mind, through thought‛ and ‚accept, take to be true (or take as such).‛50 I would 
not be that optimistic on the prospects of bringing these together. There seems to be much more 
in the idea of ‚accepting as true,‛ which should be divorced from identifying things, and it 
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should be developed into two directions: on the one hand, to the theme of ‚recognition that so 
and so is the case,‛ and on the other hand, to the broader issue of recognizing normative claims 
as valid. There is more to be said about the formulation ‚recognizing that so and so is the case.‛ 
Ricœur does not thematize the change from ‚ideas of objects‛ to ‚propositionally structured 
thoughts‛ which is crucial for analytical philosophy from Frege onwards (which Ricœur more or 
less bypasses in silence, in contrast to the dialogue with analytical philosophy in his Oneself as 
Another). Admittedly, a discussion on the difference between recognizing objects and recognizing 
that such and such is a case would have taken us beyond the current limits of the  politics of 
recognition -framework in general: recognition is primarily, and for good reasons, taken to be 
about relations to persons (and objects), and not to propositions or states of affairs.51  But once we 
note the difference, it sounds wrong to say, as Ricœur does, that the subject of ‚accepting as true‛ 
is ‚the same subject that later in our inquiry will demand to be recognized.‛52 Typically, persons 
can be recognized as worthy of respect, as meriting esteem and so on, but rarely as true (with the 
exception of ‚true friends‛ or ‚being true to themselves‛). It is primarily propositions, 
statements, and beliefs that are true. So there are reasons not to collate the distinction between 
recognition as true and identification as something, not to mention recognition as true and 
recognition as a person. 
Recognition-Attestation of Oneself as a Capable Agent 
The Second Chapter introduces an important presupposition to any debates about 
mutual recognition: the fact that we are able to act, that we are agents, capable of taking 
responsibility. Despite the title, the chapter does not focus so much on identity, that is, on 
practical, existential or narrative answers to the question ‚who am I?‛ It does not even mention 
the expressivist issue of recognizing oneself in one’s achievements or deeds.53 It is rather about 
self-assertion, attestation, and recognition of our general nature as agents, as having capacities. It 
is more about one’s standing as being capable of taking responsibility than about the particular 
acts for which we do take responsibility. 
Insightfully, Ricœur points out that there is a special sense of certitude or suspicion in 
expressions of the type ‚I believe that I can.‛  Ricœur calls this ‚recognition-attestation.‛54 What 
is at stake is a kind of existential or practical confidence in one’s capacities, which is not reducible 
to the degree of belief that availed evidence would support. Admittedly, at any moment a 
skeptical doubt that I might have been just paralyzed and no longer a functioning agent is in 
theory possible, but more importantly there are more existential worries along the lines that 
should I commit myself to this or that task - will I be able to cope?  
The immediate object of such recognition-attestation is on ‚capacities,‛ but by a detour 
through the ‚what‛ and ‚how‛ there is a reflexion on the ‚who.‛ The self in self-designation 
recognizes itself as the agent possessing these capacities. So ultimately, what is at stake is literally 
self-recognition in two senses: recognition of oneself by oneself. There are various things one 
could expect from the topic of self-recognition, which Ricœur does not touch here and which 
would deserve book-length studies on their own. These include self-confidence, self-esteem, self-
respect, self-evaluation, (narrative) self-definition, self-interpretation, self-understanding, self-
constitution, self-knowledge, self-acceptance or tolerance of oneself, among others. (It may of 
course be better that Ricœur makes one point with more force: agency and agentic capacities are 
crucial.) 
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An interesting question not pursued here is how recognition, in the sense of approval 
from others, affects my definitions of myself, my answer to the question ‚who am I?‛ There are 
various senses one can give to this question, from ‚thick‛ forms such as practical identity (what 
are my fundamental aims in life?), evaluative self-image (how do I esteem myself in terms of the 
features I have, and what sorts of responses from others would seem misrecognition in terms of 
these features?), and narrative identity (where am I coming from and where am I heading to?) to 
the ‚thin‛ question of which singular self, ipse, I am (whose stream of experiences do I identify 
with as mine?). The answer to the last question is typically immediate and quite obvious, but in 
some psychopathologies (and thought-experiments) this ‚thin‛ core sense of self can be 
disturbed, for instance, with what used to be called ‚multiple personality disorder.‛ Its 
immediate and obvious nature is nicely illustrated by Ricœur’s discussion of a man without 
qualities, who says ‚I am nobody‛ and nonetheless remains a continuing center of experiences. 
So, the questions raised here would include, how is one’s practical identity, narrative identity, 
evaluative self-image or one’s thin ipseity dialogically constituted or structured in relations of 
recognition? In pursuing these questions, Ricœur’s earlier work on narrative identity would be 
among the compulsory reading list. With the help of Ricœur’s conecptualizations one could ask 
various questions:55 How do struggles of recognition contribute to the ‚discordant concordance‛ 
typical of narratives?56 Are there certain kinds of narratives that are devised to get recognition 
from others? Is one way in which expectations and recognition from others matters in the way 
that it shapes our narrative identity? 
The Struggle for Recognition and States of Peace 
As mentioned above, Ricœur questions the importance of the idea of ‚struggle‛ for 
recognition that Hobbes, Hegel, Honneth, Thevenot and Boltanski all give a central place in 
different ways. Ricœur asks: ‚when, we may ask, does a subject deem him- or herself to be truly 
recognized?‛57 Ricœur sees that this might be an insatiable quest. ‚Does not the claim for 
affective, juridical and social recognition, through its militant, conflictual style, end up as an 
indefinite demand, a kind of ‘bad infinity’?‛58 One can reconceptualize this apparent worry of 
infinite demands by focusing on the ‚grammar‛ or ‚logic‛ of demands and their conditions of 
satisfaction, on the one hand, and the question of justified expectations or demands and 
unjustified expectations or demands, on the other hand. The worry that demands are insatiable, 
that ‚nothing is enough‛ does not seem founded once these distinctions are taken into account. 
First of all, any normative demand has its conditions of satisfaction built into it. They of 
course vary from the simple ‚do not step on anyone’s toes‛ to the hugely complex ‚gender 
equality is to be realized globally.‛ However complex, each demand is in principle limited: the 
demand in question does not require anything more than what it demands. It is not the case that 
nothing suffices, or that nothing is enough. For example, the demand for global gender equality 
is satisfied, when gender equality is realized globally – and that is enough. No further 
improvements in the relative position of women in comparison to men are being demanded – for 
example, female superiority is not part of the demand. And when the demand for global gender 
equality is met, that particular historical struggle is over (at least unless there are fresh 
drawbacks). This is a conceptual point, and not an epistemic one: I do not wish to pretend that it 
would be easy to know the exact contours of any complex demand. Nonetheless, there are clear 
cases which serve to make the conceptual point about demands and their satisfaction. 
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Second, it is not the case that all demands and expectations are justified: to stick to the 
same example, the demand for global female superiority would not be. There is no basis for the 
fear that by acknowledging some demands as justified, one should somehow then acknowledge 
all demands as justified. There is not even an apparent threat ‚bad infinite.‛ Whether or not one 
has to struggle before the demands are met does not change this basic ‚grammar‛ or ‚logic‛ at 
all. 
Third, a complex issue such as global gender equality may seem so complex, and its full 
realization so distant in the future, as to create the misguided non-literal sense of ‚nothing 
suffices‛: once formal equality is achieved, say equal rights for men and women, there are 
further, material aspects of inequality, and the very same demand for global gender equality may 
include them. So the struggle, work and effort must continue in cases like these – but in these 
cases, suggesting ‚a state of peace‛ would merely serve the interests of the ruling group, and 
should of course be resisted. It ain’t over ‘til it’s over. This kind of progress can be seen, for 
example, in the expansion of rights-discourse from basic rights to social and cultural rights, and 
in the inclusion of new classes of rights-holders. 
Ricœur’s worry thus seems out of place. ‚Being adequately recognized‛ is the state that 
follows when the demands for respect, social esteem and so on are being adequately met, and 
when that is achieved, all parties may rest content. This is not to deny that genuine peace and 
mere truce are different states. There are more and less peaceful ways in which normative 
demands can be met, as illustrated by the way disputes are settled in courts: ‚the judge thus 
appears as bearing not only the scales of justice but a sword. The dispute is settled, but it is 
merely spared of vengeance, without yet being a state of peace.‛59 But that as such has nothing to 
do with the apparent insatiability of the demand in question – these are two ways in which a 
demand is satisfied. Thus, there’s all the reason to believe that demands for recognition are in 
principle satiable, but that we live in a world where globally speaking even the demands of basic 
respect are not adequately met. 
To recap, once we distinguish justified demands of recognition from unjustified ones, the 
relevant ‚end‛ for the struggles comes with the satisfaction of justified demands. Of course, 
things are messy in practice, but conceptually speaking the issue seems clear: the contrast of 
struggles motivated by justified demands of recognition with achieved adequate and peaceful 
recognition is not a contrast between two areas of life in which recognition matters (say, legal 
rights and gift-exchange), but a contrast between two stages of the process of recognition in any 
area where there are justified demands of recognition. And expansions of these areas are 
unjustified only to the extent that the demands of recognition are unjustified. Two important 
qualifications are at place: First of all, there are areas of life that should be protected from public 
recognition (namely, those violating one’s privacy), but in those contexts struggles for recognition 
as well as peaceful recognition would be out of place. And again, fighting too narrow 
understandings of what is public and what is private may well call for further justified demands 
of recognition. Secondly, and importantly for Ricœur, there may be areas of life where genuine 
recognition can take place and is very welcome, but where demands of recognition do not make 
sense given the nature of the case. There are many things that the recipient is not in a position to 
require, demand or claim, but which (partly for that reason) are cases of genuine recognition: 
receiving gifts, or love, or expressions of friendliness. To recap, I find Ricœur’s balancing act 
between struggles and peace very welcome, but the suggestion that the demands might be 
insatiable, or a form of the bad infinite, does not seem well founded. What can meaningfully be 
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demanded can meaningfully be satisfied – but there are also independently meaningful and 
satisfactory things that cannot be demanded (such as gifts), and also areas where public 
recognition could be detrimental (such as private life). 
To conclude, Ricœur’s work on recognition enriches contemporary debates on 
recognition in many ways. It takes seriously the fact that the semantic field of ‚recognition‛ is 
broader than ‚intersubjectivity.‛ Together with the consulted dictionaries and contemporary 
debates, as well as Ricœur’s earlier work, the full course of recognition might be something like 
the following: i) recognition-identification of something as ‚a something‛ at all, or as this 
particular thing, or a thing with these and these particular features, or as a thing of this generic 
kind; ii) recognition-adhesion in accepting a proposition as true; iii) recognition-adhesion in 
accepting a norm as valid; iv) recognition-attestation of oneself as a capable agent, a person 
(‚what am I?‛) or as this kind of person (‚who am I?,‛ ‚what am I like?,‛ ‚what kind of person 
am I?,‛ ‚where do I stand?‛), as being this irreplaceable, singular person (‚who am I?,‛ ‚which 
person am I?‛); v) recognition of others in the sense of esteem, respect or approbation or love. 
And perhaps one should add the following: vi) recognition of collective agents, institutions, 
organizations, groups. Ricœur’s book also makes a number of substantive contributions to which 
this essay has not done justice: for example, the phenomena of gift-giving and gratitude, and the 
idea drawn from Boltanski and Thevenot of spheres of esteem are insightfully combined by 
Ricœur to the debates on mutual recognition. And while the book does not really discuss how 
ipse-identity and narrative identity are always developed in webs of recognition, Ricœur’s earlier 
work provides the means for doing that.60 
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